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Abstract 
 
The paper presents an empirical analysis of the innovative activities of business groups in 
Latin America. It compares the innovativeness of group-affiliated firms (GAFs) and 
standalone firms (SAFs), and it investigates how country-specific institutional factors – 
financial, legal, and labor market institutions – affect the group-innovation relationship. The 
empirical analysis is based on the most recent wave of the World Bank Enterprise Survey 
(period 2010-2011), and it focuses on a sample of 6500 manufacturing firms across 20 Latin 
American countries. The econometric results point out two major conclusions. First, GAFs are 
more innovative than SAFs: we estimate the innovation propensity of GAFs to be 9% higher 
than that of SAFs. Secondly, across countries, the innovativeness of GAFs is higher for 
national economies with a better institutional system than for countries with a less efficient 
institutional set up.  
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1. Introduction 
Business groups permeate emerging economies, often accounting for a substantial share of 
value added and employment. A business group can be defined as “a set of firms which 
though legally independent, are bound together by a constellation of formal and informal ties 
and are accustomed to taking coordinated action” (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001: 47).  
The existence, ubiquity and remarkable dynamics of business groups in emerging markets has 
stimulated a large amount of research, which has investigated a number of related topics such 
as the reasons for the emergence of groups, their ownership structure, their differentiation and 
vertical integration patterns, and their economic performance (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; 
Colpan et al., 2010). The existing literature does on the whole provide a rich and thorough 
characterization of business groups and their importance for economic development. There 
are however two important issues and open questions that deserve further scholarly attention, 
and which provide the motivations for undertaking the present study. 
The first is that, while there exist several studies focusing on the financial and economic 
performance of groups, much less is known about their strategies, i.e. how groups organize 
their business activities and what makes them more (or less) successful than independent 
enterprises. One important organizational strategy that deserves closer attention is innovation. 
The question of how business groups organize their innovative activities represents an 
important though unexplored area of research. A few recent studies have raised this question, 
and provided empirical evidence suggesting that GAFs are on average more innovative than 
SAFs. This is due, among other factors, to business groups’ greater access to financial and 
human capital resources, as well as their ability to take advantage of within-group and foreign 
spillovers (Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004; Mahmood and Lee, 2004; Belenzon and Berkovitz, 
2010). 
The second question that deserves further research refers to the effects of country-specific 
institutional characteristics on the performance and strategies of business groups. An 
important argument discussed in the literature is the so-called institutional voids thesis. 
According to this, business groups originate and prosper when national institutions are weak 
and, correspondingly, groups performance is relatively better in countries characterized by 
weaker institutions than in economies with well-functioning institutional set ups (Khanna and 
Yafeh, 2007; Carney et al., 2011). 
This argument has recently been extended by Chang et al. (2006) to the study of business 
groups’ innovativeness. In line with the standard interpretation of the institutional voids 
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thesis, Chang et al. (2006)’s argument is that the positive effects of group affiliation on 
innovation are stronger in less developed (emerging) economies, in which groups make up for 
market failures and institutional weaknesses, particularly with respect to financial 
infrastructure, legal institutions and labor markets regulations. 
These two open questions motivate and structure the present paper. Our first objective is to 
provide new evidence on business groups’ innovative activities in Latin America, and 
investigate whether group-affiliated firms (GAFs) are more innovative than standalone firms 
(SAFs). Our second objective is to reassess the institutional voids thesis and its relevance to 
study the innovative activities of firms in Latin America, and analyze in particular how 
country-specific institutional characteristics affect the relationship between group affiliation 
and innovation. 
The empirical analysis makes use of the most recent wave of the World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys (WBES) database, referring to the period 2010-2011. The WBES is a rich and 
extensive survey dataset of several thousand business firms in developing countries, providing 
information on their characteristics, strategies, economic performance, as well as their 
perceptions of the institutional, policy and economic environment in which they operate. A 
key characteristic of the WBES dataset is that it contains information on firms’ ownership, so 
that we are able to identify which firms in the database are part of a domestic group, and 
distinguish these from the group of standalone firms.  
Our study focuses on a sample of around 6500 manufacturing enterprises in 20 different 
countries in Latin America. The topic of business groups’ innovation activities and their 
relationships to national institutional conditions is highly relevant for emerging economies in 
Latin America (Schneider, 2009). During the last two decades, many Latin American 
economies have undertaken extensive institutional changes and economic reforms – such as 
privatizations, trade liberalization, financial and macroeconomic stabilization – intended to 
make domestic markets more open, competitive and efficient. The new competitive 
environment opens up new challenges and opportunities for domestic firms in the region, and 
it is thus important to study how business groups are responding to the changing economic 
environment, and the extent to which their strategies and performance differ from those of 
standalone enterprises. 
On the whole, the paper contributes to the literature along three main dimensions. First, we 
provide new evidence and quantitative analysis of business groups strategies and innovation 
activities. In line with the few recent studies on this topic, we find that GAFs are more 
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innovative than SAFs, and we estimate the innovation propensity of GAFs to be 9% higher 
than that of SAFs.  
Secondly, we carry out a cross-country test of the institutional voids thesis and its relation to 
firms’ innovation activities. Our results differ from those of Chang et al. (2006). We show 
that, across countries in Latin America, the innovativeness of GAFs is higher for national 
economies with a better institutional system than for countries with a less efficient 
institutional set up. Financial, legal and labor market institutions provide an important 
infrastructure sustaining business firms’ innovation activities, and this enhancing effect is 
stronger for group-affiliated firms in well-functioning and better-organized national systems 
of innovation.  
Finally, by making use of the extensive set of firm-level information available in the WBES 
database, our paper suggests a new avenue for empirical analyses in the field. We show that 
this dataset can be used to compare business groups’ characteristics, strategies and 
performance for several thousand firms across the whole developing world. The results 
presented in this paper, therefore, can be replicated and extended in future research on 
business groups in emerging economies. 
 
 
2. Business groups in Latin America 
Business groups have for a long time been dominant players in Latin American economies. 
They are typically large, family-owned, hierarchically controlled and diversified. They 
account for a large share of value added and employment in many countries in the region. 
Schneider (2009) points out business groups as a key dimension of the Latin American variety 
of capitalism, which he defines as hierarchical market economies. Hierarchical market 
economies in Latin America, a hybrid type between the two standard categories of liberal 
market economies and coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001), are in 
particular sustained by four main pillars (Schneider, 2009): (1) the relevance of diversified 
business groups, (2) a high-presence of multinational corporations, (3) low-skilled labor, (4) 
atomistic labor relations coupled with extensive (and often inefficient) labor market 
regulations (Botero et al., 2004). These four characteristics are closely intertwined and tend to 
reinforce each other: it is these institutional complementarities that explain why business 
groups constitute a structural and long-standing feature of this region. 
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Despite their importance, empirical data and evidence on business groups in Latin America is 
scant and far more limited than it is the case for other emerging economies (e.g. in East Asia). 
Chile is the economy in the region with a relatively better availability of information on 
business groups’ strategies and performance. Khanna and Palepu (2000) used this information 
to study the relationship between diversification and the financial performance of groups in 
Chile in the period 1988-1996. Khanna and Rivkin (2006) analyzed the relationships between 
interorganizational ties, family ownership and business groups. Another important work on 
Chile was presented by Khanna and Palepu (1999), which investigated the evolution of 18 
large and diversified groups in the period 1987-1997, and showed that deregulation and other 
economic reforms in this decade did not have a negative effect on the performance of 
domestic business groups, as one would expect, but they rather contributed to strengthen their 
market dominance. 
More recently, a set of descriptive studies have provided new information and an updated 
overview of business groups in other Latin American countries: Argentina (Fracchia et al., 
2010), Brazil (Aldrighi and Postali, 2010), Mexico (Hoshino, 2010) and Central American 
countries (Bull and Kasahara, 2012). Although some country specificities exist, these studies 
identify some important commonalities. In most cases, groups originated several decades ago, 
and their initial formation and growth was closely linked and actively supported by public 
policies, such as State-led industrialization strategies, public ownership, trade protection and 
public procurement. Business groups have traditionally had close ties to national governments 
and often a strong political influence on them. The extensive process of economic reforms 
that was undertaken in many countries in the region during the 1980s and 1990s – 
privatizations, trade liberalization, financial and macroeconomic stabilization – does not seem 
to have affected groups more than other firms. Business groups did in fact grow stronger and 
found new strategies to survive in the new highly competitive environment. As a result, 
business groups do still play today a major role in all of these economies. 
Despite these recent contributions, empirical evidence on business groups in Latin America is 
still limited and far less extensive than it is the case for East Asian countries. On the one hand, 
most of the existing recent studies are descriptive in nature and do not provide insights on 
how the performance of business groups is affected by group-specific characteristics and 
strategies, such as ownership, diversification, internationalization and technological 
innovation. The latter is an increasingly important factor for catching up countries in the 
region (Castellacci and Archibugi, 2008; Castellacci, 2011), and it is therefore important to 
investigate business groups’ capabilities and technological performance. 
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On the other hand, a second important research gap in this literature is that most of the 
existing studies focus on individual countries, and there exist very few cross-country studies 
comparing groups’ characteristics and dynamics across countries in Latin America. This 
limits our ability to understand the relationships between country-specific characteristics, 
institutional features and firm-level performance. Specifically, cross-country analyses are 
important as they may provide insights on the empirical validity of the so-called institutional 
voids thesis: that business groups originate and prosper when national institutions are weak 
and that, correspondingly, groups performance is relatively better in countries characterized 
by weaker institutions than in economies with well-functioning institutional set ups (Khanna 
and Yafeh, 2007; Carney et al., 2011). 
Khanna and Rivkin (2001) present a cross-country analysis of 14 emerging markets, which 
does not find any significant evidence that group-affiliated firms have a better financial 
performance than standalone enterprises for the four Latin American economies in the sample 
(Mexico, Chile, Brazil and Argentina). Khanna and Yafeh (2005) carry out a cross-country 
test of the institutional voids thesis, reporting no significant correlation between countries’ 
quality of legal and financial institutions and business groups’ extent and performance. These 
studies, taken together with the literature presented in this section, are suggestive. In Latin 
America, groups emerged and originally prospered through active public support and 
protection. Even after the wave of economic reforms in the 1990s and the related institutional 
upgrading, groups did not disappear or worsened their performance, but found new strategies 
and ways to compete, often maintaining their close ties to national authorities. This calls for 
an investigation of the institutional voids thesis for the case of Latin America, and an analysis 
of its relation to business groups’ innovation strategies and performance. 
 
 
3. Theory and hypotheses 
The first question we investigate is whether group-affiliated firms (GAFs) are more 
innovative than standalone firms (SAFs). A few studies have recently extended the business 
groups literature to analyze this unexplored topic (Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004; Mahmood 
and Lee, 2004; Chang et al., 2006; Belenzon and Berkovitz, 2010). The empirical results of 
these works all point to a positive impact of group affiliation on innovation, due to the 
following channels. 
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First, GAFs can more easily get access to financial capital within the group when external 
financial markets are inefficient, and hence also reduce the uncertainties related to R&D 
investments. Secondly, when the country has a low level of human capital and workers’ skills, 
GAFs may provide workers with training and more efficiently allocate labor resources 
internally within the group. Thirdly, when the home market is not well developed, GAFs may 
overcome the lack of independent suppliers and advanced users by linking to other firms of 
the same (vertically-integrated) group. Hence, vertical integration may partly substitute for the 
lack of a good home market. Relatedly, GAFs may have greater access to internal information 
and advanced knowledge (within-group spillovers). Fourthly, due to their established market 
position and distribution network, GAFs are in a better position to develop collaborations with 
foreign firms and MNEs, so possibly exploiting knowledge imitation and foreign spillovers.  
We argue that these general arguments are highly plausible for the Latin American context, 
and it is therefore reasonable to point out this first hypothesis for our study: 
 
H1: GAFs are more innovative than SAFs. 
 
The second question we investigate is whether country-specific institutional factors affect 
firm-level innovation, and whether these effects are stronger for GAFs than for SAFs. As 
noted in the previous section, we intend to provide a cross-country test of the institutional 
voids thesis and assess its empirical validity within the Latin American context. In its general 
formulation, this thesis argues that business groups originate and prosper when national 
institutions are weak and that, correspondingly, groups performance is relatively better in 
countries characterized by weaker institutions than in economies with well-functioning 
institutional set ups (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Carney et al., 2011). This argument has 
recently been extended by Chang et al. (2006) to the study of business groups’ 
innovativeness. Chang et al. (2006)’s argument is that the positive effects of group affiliation 
on innovation are more relevant in less developed (emerging) economies, in which groups 
make up for market failures and institutional weaknesses, particularly with respect to financial 
infrastructure, legal institutions and labor markets regulations. 
We take a different point of view on this question. Our paper argues that it is not 
straightforward to extend the institutional voids thesis to the study of business groups’ 
innovation activities, and that the conclusions may well be that groups’ innovativeness is 
stronger in countries characterized by better and more efficient institutions, rather than in 
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economies with weaker institutional set ups. We develop and explain this argument in three 
steps. 
First, an important and commonly shared starting point in the innovation literature is that 
firms’ innovation investments are enabled and supported by country-level institutions (so-
called national systems of innovation; Nelson, 1993; Castellacci and Natera, 2012). In 
particular, financial institutions favor private firms’ access to finance, making available 
resources to invest in R&D; legal institutions and an efficient court system favor commercial 
transactions, contract enforcing and the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs); and 
labor market regulations affect the pool of human resources that a firm can draw from, or 
determine the flexibility of the labor market and the ability of firms to hire new workers. 
These arguments are not only in line with the national systems of innovation literature, but are 
also related to the varieties of capitalism framework, which emphasizes the importance of 
public institutions as a supportive framework for private firms’ performance and 
innovativeness, and the complementarities among different institutional conditions that tend 
to reinforce each other and make, among other things, groups as a permanent feature of 
emerging economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Schneider, 2009). We summarize this by 
pointing out the following general hypothesis: 
 
H2: Financial, legal and labor market institutions are important factors for firms’ innovation .  
 
Secondly, we ask whether country-level institutions are more relevant for the innovativeness 
of GAFs than for SAFs. Our standpoint is that – within each country – financial, legal and 
labor market institutions are more supportive of innovative activities for GAFs than SAFs. 
The reason is that GAFs are in general better established in the market, and have a greater 
propensity and capability to undertake innovation activities (as pointed out by H1). Hence, the 
lack of well-functioning institutions supporting innovations will affect GAFs relatively more 
than SAFs. In other words, GAFs are more exposed to the lack of innovation infrastructures 
than SAFs since they have higher innovation propensity. For instance, if legal institutions in a 
country are weak, the lack of IPRs protection and efficient contract enforcing mechanisms 
will penalize GAFs more strongly than SAFs since the former have R&D investments more 
frequently than the latter. 
 
H3: Within each country, financial, legal and labor market institutions are more important 
factors for the innovativeness of GAFs than SAFs. 
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Thirdly, what are the cross-country implications of this argument? Since GAFs are more 
engaged in innovation than SAFs (H1), and given that institutional weaknesses will affect the 
former more than the latter (H3), the implication of our argument is that, across countries, the 
better the institutional system, the stronger will be the innovation performance of GAFs as 
compared to that of SAFs. Our hypothesis is then different from the point made by Chang et 
al. (2006). While we agree that GAFs may have strong internal capabilities and resources and 
hence partly make up for weak or inefficient institutions, we also argue that firm-level 
innovative activities are greatly supported by country-level infrastructures and national 
systems of innovation: the stronger and more efficient these country-specific support 
mechanisms, the higher the innovativeness of business groups.   
 
H4: Across countries, the difference between the innovativeness of GAFs and SAFs is 
stronger in countries with better financial, legal and labor market institutions.  
 
 
4. Data and indicators 
Our empirical analysis makes use of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) database. 
This is a rich and extensive survey dataset of several thousand business firms in nearly all 
developing countries, providing information on their characteristics, strategies, economic 
performance, as well as their perceptions of the institutional, policy and economic 
environment in which they operate. The WBES follows a stratified random sampling with 
replacement, based on firm size, business sector and geographic region as the main strata, 
which ensures representativeness of the results within each country. The survey questionnaire 
follows a standard template, in order to ensure cross-country comparability of the results.1 
We focus on the most recent wave of the WBES, the one referring to the period 2010-2011. A 
key characteristic of the WBES dataset does now contain information on firms’ ownership. 
From this information, we are able to identify which firms in the database are part of a 
domestic group (GAFs), and distinguish these from the group of standalone firms (SAFs). 
This information is very valuable from the point of view of the business groups literature. So 
far, group identification has in fact been a controversial and difficult task for empirical works 
in this field (Khanna, 2000; Yafeh, 2005), and the information on group affiliation has often 
                                                             
1 For a detailed description of the dataset and its methodology, see the WBES page: www.enterprisesurveys.org. 
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been limited to enterprises within a specific country. The present paper, by making use of the 
new information available in the WBES 2010, suggests a new avenue for empirical analyses 
in the field, making it possible to compare business group characteristics, strategies and 
performance for several thousand firms across the whole developing world. 
Our study focuses on 20 Latin American countries, covering nearly the whole region.2 The 
whole sample contains a total number of around 13 000 firms, covering all sectors of 
economic activity (agriculture, manufacturing and services). However, since one of the 
variables of our interest, technological innovation, is only available for firms in the 
manufacturing sector, we eventually narrowed down our sample to a total number of around 
6500 enterprises. 
The empirical analysis makes use of the following 12 indicators. Table 1 presents some 
descriptive statistics for the whole sample, table 2 reports the mean of the variables for each 
country, and table 3 shows the coefficients of correlation among these indicators. 
 
GAF: Group-affiliated firm. Dummy variable indicating whether an enterprise is part of a 
domestic group. This indicator has been obtained by interacting (multiplying) two dummy 
variables of the WBES questionnaire: (1) the one reporting whether “the establishment is part 
of a larger firm” (question A.7); (2) the one indicating whether “the firm is owned by private 
domestic individuals, companies or organizations”.3 This variable is then able to distinguish 
two types of enterprises in our sample: domestic group-affiliated firms (GAFs) and domestic 
standalone firms (SAFs). Table 1 shows that 12,4% in our sample are GAFs, and table 2 
indicates that there is substantial variability in the presence of GAFs across countries in the 
region, ranging from only 1% in Colombia to more than 20% in Argentina and Bolivia.  
 
INNO: Innovation. Dummy variable indicating whether an enterprise has carried out R&D 
investments in the period (question LAC.E6). This is a standard indicator of technological 
innovation, which is the predominant type of innovation for firms in manufacturing industries. 
R&D investments are not only important because they lead to the introduction of brand new 
products and processes, but also because they increase a firm’s capability to imitate external 
advanced knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The indicator is therefore useful to 
                                                             
2 The list of countries in the sample is available in table 2. We were forced to disregard Brazil from our analysis, 
since the Brazilian questionnaire does not contain any information on firms’ innovation activities.  
 
3 This second variable has been obtained from question B.2a, assuming that a firm is domestically owned if at 
least 50% of its ownership belongs to private domestic individuals, companies or organizations. 
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measure Latin American firms’ innovation propensity as well as their imitation ability. On 
average, 45% of manufacturing firms in the sample have undertaken R&D investments in the 
period.4 
 
SIZE: Size of the firm. Categorical indicator taking three possible values: 1 if the firm has 
between 5 and 20 employees; 2 if it has between 20 and 100 workers; 3 if it has more than 
100 employees (question A.6 of the WBES survey). The average firm size category in our 
sample is 2 (between 20 and 100 workers), and the cross-country variability of this indicator 
is low: in all of the Latin American countries in the sample, small and medium-sized 
enterprises constitute the bulk of the business population. 
 
AGE: Age of the enterprise. Number of years since the establishment began operations 
(question B.5). The variable ranges from 0 to 340 years, and the mean value is approximately 
28 years. Argentina, Chile and Uruguay are the countries with the oldest average firm (around 
34 years). 
 
QUALITY: Quality certification. Dummy variable indicating whether the firm has “an 
internationally-recognized quality certification, such as ISO 9000, 9002 or 14000” (question 
B.8). On average 28% of enterprises in the sample report to have obtained quality certification 
(highest percentage is 38% in Argentina and Chile). 
 
EDUC: Education level. “Average number of years of education of a typical permanent full-
time production worker employed in the establishment” (question L.9a). The mean value in 
the region is 10 years. Central American countries do mostly score below the average on this 
indicator.  
 
ICT: ICT infrastructure. Dummy variable reporting whether a firm has “a high-speed 
Internet connection on its premises” (question C.23). A large majority of firms in the sample 
(87%) report to have good Internet infrastructure, although the variable differs substantially 
                                                             
4 In addition to this R&D variable, we have also used a dummy variable indicating whether the firm has 
introduced a new product in the period (NEW_PROD). The new product dummy measures the outcome of 
innovation. It is interesting to use this variable, along with the R&D dummy, in order to see whether the main 
patterns investigated in the paper also hold for the innovation performance of firms in addition to their 
innovation propensity. 
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across countries – ranging from 95% in Argentina, Colombia and Ecuador to below 65% in 
most Central American countries. 
 
DIVERSIF: Product diversification. Percentage of total sales represented by other products 
than the firm’s main product (question D.1a3). The mean value of this variable in the sample 
is 30%, although less developed economies in Central America have on average a lower 
degree of product diversification than more advanced countries in South America. 
 
URBAN: Urban density. Indicator reporting the size of the city in which the firm is located. 
The variable is categorical and takes five possible values: 1 if it is a town with less than 50000 
inhabitants; 2 between 50000 and 250000 people; 3 between 250000 and 1 million; 4 if it is a 
city with population over 1 million, but not a capital city; 5 if it is a capital city. The indicator 
is obtained from question A.3, and it is used as a proxy for urban density and agglomeration 
economies. 
 
FINANCE: Financial system. Variable indicating whether “access to finance – which 
includes availability and cost, interest rates, fees and collateral requirements – is an obstacle 
to the current operations of the firm” (question K.30). The variable is categorical, ranging 
from a value of 0 (no obstacle) to 4 (very severe obstacle). 
 
LEGAL: Legal system. Variable indicating whether legal courts represent an obstacle to the 
current operations of the enterprise (question J.30). The variable is categorical, ranging from a 
value of 0 (no obstacle) to 4 (very severe obstacle). 
 
LABOR: Labor regulations. Variable indicating whether “labor regulations are an obstacle 
to the current operations of the firm” (question L.30). The variable is categorical, ranging 
from a value of 0 (no obstacle) to 4 (very severe obstacle). 
 
These three last variables, FINANCE, LEGAL and LABOR, represent our indicators of 
country-specific institutional conditions. They are measured at the firm-level, indicating 
private firms’ perceptions of the institutional environment in which they operate. The country 
average of these variables provides a measure of the institutional and regulatory set up that 
characterizes each national economy.  
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< Tables 1, 2 and 3 here > 
 
 
5. Econometric model and methods 
The econometric analysis seeks to estimate the relationship between group affiliation (GAF 
dummy) and firms’ innovation (INNO dummy), and how this relationship is affected by 
country-specific institutional factors. As noted in previous research, one main issue that arises 
in this context is that some firm-specific characteristics (measured or unobservable) may 
affect both the probability that a firm is a GAF and its performance. Khanna (2000: 752) calls 
this issue “winner picking”: if a firm has a successful performance, it is more likely that it will 
be invited to join a business group. A similar issue may arise in our study. Some firm-specific 
characteristics may in principle affect both the probability that a firm is selected to take part in 
a group and its ability or propensity to innovate. If this is the case, a problem of selection bias 
arises, due to the fact that firms self-select into two different categories, GAFs and SAFs, and 
this will affect the estimation of the group-innovation relationship.  
In order to properly take account of this issue, we use a two-equation approach and model 
both the probability that an enterprise is a GAF (equation 1) and its innovation propensity 
(equation 2). The first equation studies the factors that may determine why a firm is selected 
to take part in a group, whereas the second equation estimates the determinants of its 
innovation propensity. These two equations form a recursive system of equations, since the 
dependent variable in equation 1 (GAF dummy) is included among the explanatory variables 
in equation 2. The full model specification is the following: 
 
GAFi = α1 + β1 SIZEi + γ1 AGEi + δ1 QUALITYi + ζ1 DIVERSIFi + η1 LEGALi +                     
+ θ1 FINANCEi + κ1 LABORi + λ1 Si + ρ1 Ci + εi1                                                                  (1) 
  
INNOi = ς2 + ω2 GAFi + β2 SIZEi + γ2 AGEi + δ2 QUALITYi + σ2 EDUCi + τ2 ICTi +              
+ η2 LEGALi + θ2 FINANCEi + κ2 LABORi + φ2 URBANi + ψ2 INTERACTi + λ2 Si + ρ2 Ci +   
+ εi2                                                                                                                                                                                                                 (2) 
 
In both equations, the explanatory variables include a set of firm-level characteristics (size, 
age, quality, product diversification, education level, ICT infrastructures, urban density), three 
country-level factors (legal, financial and labor market institutions), some interaction 
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variables (defined below), plus the full set of sector and country dummies (Si and Ci 
respectively). 
All the firm-specific control variables are expected to take a positive sign in the estimations: 
the firm’s probability to be part of a group (equation 1) and its innovation propensity 
(equation 2) are assumed to be positively related to the enterprise’s size, age, product quality, 
degree of product diversification, human capital, ICT infrastructures, and geographical 
(urban) location.  The GAF variable in equation 2 is also assumed to be positive. As stated in 
hypothesis 1, GAFs are expected to have higher innovation propensity than SAFs.  
The role of the three country-level factors – legal, financial and labor market institutions – 
and their interactions with firm-specific factors, was pointed out by hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 (see 
section 3). Hypothesis 2 postulates a positive relationship between these three institutional 
factors and the firm’s innovation propensity in equation 2.  
Hypothesis 3 points out that these institutional characteristics are more important factors for 
the innovativeness of GAFs than SAFs. We test this by creating three interaction variables, 
each of which interacts the GAF dummy with the three country-level institutional factors. 
These three interaction variables are included in equation 2 and are expected to have a 
positive sign in the estimations.  
Finally, hypothesis 4 argues that, across countries, GAFs’ innovativeness is higher in 
countries with better financial, legal and labor market institutions. We also test this by 
introducing six additional interaction terms in equation 2. These interaction variables are 
constructed as follows. First, for each of the three institutional variables, we carried out a 
simple hierarchical cluster analysis and divided the 20 countries in the sample into two 
groups: those whose institutional system is above average and those below average. Secondly, 
for each institutional variable, we created two interaction variables, one between the GAF 
dummy and the “above average” country group dummy, and one between GAF and the 
“below average” country group dummy. Put it simply, these interaction variables test the 
hypothesis that the relationship between GAF and INNO is piecewise linear: according to 
hypothesis 4, we expect all of these interaction terms to have a positive sign, but we also 
expect the estimated coefficient to be higher for countries with a good institutional system 
than for economies with a weaker institutional set up.5 
                                                             
5 A recent debate in the applied econometrics literature discusses the use and interpretation of interaction terms 
in non-linear models such as logit and probit. Ai and Norton (2003) opened this debate and criticized the 
common interpretation of interaction terms in non-linear models. Greene (2010) and Kolasinski and Siegel 
(2010) have recently responded to this criticism and shown that the usual interpretation of interaction effects is 
reasonable and more informative than the method proposed by Ai and Norton.  
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As noted above, one important econometric issue that arises in the estimation of this model is 
so-called self-selection into categories: firms self-select into two different categories, GAFs 
and SAFs, and this is likely to affect the estimation of the group-innovation relationship. 
Since firm-specific characteristics may affect both the probability that a firm is selected to 
take part in a group and its innovation propensity, the variable GAF in equation 2 is likely to 
be correlated with the error term, and its estimated elasticity does arguably overestimate the 
effect of group affiliation on innovation. Our strategy to cope with this issue is twofold. 
First, we use propensity score matching (PSM) estimations. The basic idea of the matching 
approach is to select a group of SAFs firms in the sample which are as similar as possible to 
the corresponding group of GAFs (conditional on a set of firm-level characteristics). By 
comparing (matching) the two groups of enterprises, it is possible to obtain an unbiased 
estimate of the effect of group affiliation on innovation (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).  
The PSM method proceeds in three steps. First, it estimates the probability that a firm is a 
GAF, using as covariates variables that affect both the GAF dummy and the innovation 
dummy. This is a simple probit estimation of equation 1. Secondly, it creates two similar 
groups of firms, GAFs and SAFs, based on the propensity score obtained in the first step. 
Thirdly, it compares the mean of the two groups. This estimated difference (so-called average 
treatment effect on the treated, ATT) provides an unbiased estimate of the effect of group 
affiliation on innovation propensity. 
The second approach we use is to estimate equations 1 and 2 through a recursive bivariate 
probit method, in which both equations are simultaneously estimated and the endogeneity of 
the GAF variable in equation 2 is properly handled by the way the model is estimated. The 
recursive bivariate probit is a seemingly unrelated regression model with correlated 
disturbances, in which the dependent variable of the first equation appears on the righ-hand-
side of the second equation. The model is estimated by MLE. Greene (2003: 715-716) points 
out that in such a model the endogeneity of one of the RHS variables of the second equation 
can be neglected because this term does not affect the maximization of the log-likelihood 
(differently from what it would be the case in a linear recursive model not estimated by 
MLE). 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
6. Results 
We first present the results of propensity score matching (table 4), and then the estimations of 
our two-equation system through the recursive bivariate probit model (tables 5 and 6). As 
explained in the previous section, the PSM method selects a group of SAFs firms in the 
sample which are as similar as possible to the corresponding group of GAFs (conditional on a 
set of firm-level characteristics) and, by comparing the two groups of enterprises, it provides 
an unbiased estimate of the effect of group affiliation on innovation.  
Table 4 presents the PSM results. We compare four sets of results: for two different model 
specifications (with and without the three country-level variables), and for two different 
matching methods (K-nearest neighbors and kernel matching). These four sets of results are 
closely in line with each other. After creating two similar groups of firms (GAFs versus 
SAFs), conditional on the set of firm-level characteristics outlined in equation 1, a comparison 
of the two indicates that GAFs have on average an innovation propensity of nearly 59%, 
whereas the mean for the SAF control group is around 50%. The difference between the two 
(the ATT, i.e. the average treatment effect on the treated) is around 9%. This is our unbiased 
estimate of the effect of group affiliation on innovation propensity. These results provide 
support for our first hypothesis (H1), indicating that in our sample of firms operating in Latin 
America the innovation propensity of GAFs is 9% higher than that of SAFs.6  
 
< Table 4 here > 
 
We then shift the focus to the results of the estimations of our two-equation system through 
the recursive bivariate probit model. Equation 2 is the specification of our main interest, 
investigating the determinants of firms’ innovation propensity and providing tests of the 
hypotheses outlined in section 3. On the other hand, the estimation of equation 1, 
investigating the determinants of the probability that a firm is a GAF, simply represents a first 
stage in the econometric analysis but does not provide any direct information on the 
hypotheses of our interest. We therefore report these results in the Appendix table A1, but will 
not comment them further here. 
                                                             
6 We have also repeated the same PSM exercise with a different dependent variable, in order to test whether 
these results also hold for the indicator “NEW_PROD” (a dummy variable indicating whether the firm has 
introduced a new product in the period). The results for this innovation outcome variable are closely in line with 
those for the R&D variable: the estimated ATT is in the range between 8.6 and 9.3%. Therefore, our main result 
that GAFs are more innovative than SAFs does not only hold for the innovative propensity of firms, but it does 
also extend to their technological performance. 
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Table 5 reports the results of the estimation of equation 2. Before discussing the results of 
these tests, it is interesting to look at the estimates for the firm-specific (control) variables 
included in equation 2. As expected, four of the firm-level factors matter for the 
innovativeness of enterprises in Latin America. Firms are more likely to be innovators the 
greater their size, product quality and ICT infrastructure. Innovation propensity is also 
positively related to the size of the urban location in which firms are located, reflecting urban 
density and agglomeration economies. By contrast, differently from our expectations, two 
firm-level characteristics are not significantly related to the R&D dummy. Firm age and its 
human capital level (number of education years of full-time permanent employees) do not in 
fact seem to have an effect on the probability that an enterprise undertakes R&D investments. 
A key explanatory variable in equation 2 is the GAF dummy, which tests for our first 
hypothesis that group-affiliated firms are more innovative than standalone enterprises (H1). In 
line with the results of propensity score matching estimations, this hypothesis receives strong 
and significant support: table 5 shows that the estimated coefficient of the GAF dummy is 
positive and significant. 
Our second hypothesis argues that country-level institutions (financial, legal and labor 
market) are important for the innovativeness of firms in the region (H2). This is a general 
proposition that it is expected to hold for all firms in the sample and does not specifically refer 
to group-affiliated enterprises. Table 5 provides empirical support for this hypothesis. The 
variables FINANCE, LEGAL and LABOR are all positively and significantly related to the 
innovation dummy dependent variable. LABOR is the factor that turns out to have the 
strongest estimated coefficient, providing evidence that extensive and inefficient labor market 
regulations may prove to be an important obstacle to business firms’ activities and 
performance (Botero et al., 2004; Schneider, 2009).  
Hypothesis 3 postulates a positive relationship between financial, legal and labor market 
institutions, on the one hand, and GAFs’ innovativeness, on the other (H3). As explained in 
the previous section, we test this proposition by introducing three variables that interact the 
GAF dummy with each of the country-specific institutional variables. The interaction LEGAL 
* GROUP turns out to be positive and significant (see columns 7 and 9), whereas the other 
two are not significant. This result provides partial support for our third hypothesis, and 
suggests in particular that legal factors are more important for the innovativeness of GAFs 
than for standalone firms. Our interpretation of this result is that, if legal institutions (legal 
courts) in a country are weak, the lack of IPRs protection and efficient contract enforcing 
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mechanisms will penalize GAFs more strongly than SAFs, since the former are more engaged 
in R&D activities than the latter (as shown by H1). 
Table 6 reports the results of tests of hypothesis 4, which investigates the cross-country 
implication of the previous patterns. H4 states that, across countries, the difference between 
the innovativeness of GAFs and SAFs is stronger in countries with better financial, legal and 
labor market institutions. This proposition is tested in regressions 11, 12 and 13, which make 
use of a piecewise linear specification in which the GAF coefficient is allowed to differ across 
two country groups: one characterized by stronger and more efficient financial, legal and 
labor market institutions, and the other with a weaker and less efficient institutional set up 
(see section 5 for a definition of the six interaction variables that are inserted in regressions 
11, 12 and 13). As expected, the six interaction terms that are used to test H4 are all positive 
and significant and, in particular, they show that the effect of group affiliation on innovation 
is stronger for countries with a good institutional system than for economies characterized by 
weaker institutional conditions.  
In short, we find that, across countries in Latin America, the innovativeness of GAFs is higher 
for countries with better legal, financial and labor market systems. As discussed in section 3, 
our interpretation of this pattern is that firm-level innovative activities are greatly supported 
by country-level infrastructures and national systems of innovation: the stronger and more 
efficient these country-specific support mechanisms, the higher the innovativeness of business 
groups.   
 
< Tables 5 and 6 here > 
 
To assess the robustness of this result, it is important to consider two questions. (1) Is this 
cross-country result affected by the fact that our indicators of country-specific institutional 
conditions (FINANCE, LEGAL, LABOR) are constructed on the basis of private firms’ own 
perceptions of the institutional environment in which they operate? (2) Does this result 
indicate a specific pattern only valid for Latin American countries, rather than all emerging 
economies worldwide?  
Table 7 reports some descriptive evidence providing a negative answer to both of these 
questions. The table presents the correlation between the innovativeness of GAFs (average for 
each country) and a set of country-level indicators of financial, legal and labor market 
institutions, along with other structural characteristics (human capital, physical and ICT 
infrastructures). As indicated in the last column of the table, these indicators are taken from 
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commonly available data sources (e.g. World Bank WDI, Heritage Foundation, Botero et al., 
2004). These variables are not constructed on the basis of the enterprises’ own perceptions 
about their institutional environment, but based on the independent assessment and 
calculations made by these data providing agencies. Further, these indicators are available for 
a large cross-section of 75 emerging economies worldwide, so that we may compare patterns 
in Latin America with those elsewhere in the developing world.  
The correlation coefficients reported in table 7 all confirm the results of the test of hypothesis 
4 carried out on the WBES survey dataset. Across countries, the innovativeness of business 
groups is higher for national economies with a more developed financial infrastructure, more 
efficient legal institutions, and a less regulated and more flexible labor market. Besides, 
groups’ innovativeness is also positively related to countries’ human capital, physical and ICT 
infrastructures. These correlation patterns hold for both the Latin American sample and the 
larger sample including all emerging economies. Therefore, hypothesis 4 does not indicate a 
specific pattern only valid for Latin American countries, but rather a general regularity 
characterizing emerging economies worldwide. 
 
< Table 7 here > 
 
 
7. Discussion and conclusions 
The paper has carried out an empirical analysis of the innovative activities of business groups 
in Latin America. The study has compared the innovativeness of group-affiliated firms and 
standalone enterprises, and it has then investigated how country-specific institutional factors – 
financial, legal, and labor market institutions – affect the group-innovation relationship. The 
empirical analysis has made use of the extensive dataset made available by the most recent 
wave of the WBES (period 2010-2011), providing a rich set of information on 6500 
manufacturing firms in 20 Latin American countries. The econometric results point out two 
major conclusions, which we summarize here along with a brief discussion of their policy 
implications. 
The first main conclusion is that GAFs are more innovative than SAFs. After controlling for a 
large set of firm- and country-specific characteristics, and correcting for the possible self-
selection bias due to the winner-picking mechanism, our econometric analysis estimates that 
the innovation propensity of GAFs is about 9% higher than that for SAFs. The result of a 
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positive effect of group affiliation on innovation is in line with the other few empirical studies 
analyzing this topic (Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004; Mahmood and Lee, 2004; Chang et al., 
2006; Belenzon and Berkovitz, 2010). 
An implication of this result is that, by fostering the technological dynamics of the national 
system in which they operate, business groups have an important welfare-enhancing function 
in emerging economies, since they contribute to the process of domestic capability building 
and economic transformation through knowledge spillovers. At the same time, however, this 
also implies that standalone firms, which represent a great majority of the business population 
in Latin America, are losing ground and progressively becoming less competitive than the 
relatively small number of business groups that dominate domestic markets in these emerging 
economies. This type of diverging dynamics may have negative effects on the income 
distribution and further exacerbate income and social inequalities that do currently represent a 
major issue in Latin America. In order to counteract this diverging dynamics, national 
authorities should more systematically provide innovation policy support to standalone 
enterprises, targeting their technological capabilities, human capital as well as their access to 
financial capital and physical and ICT infrastructures. 
The second main conclusion of our empirical analysis is that, across countries, the 
innovativeness of GAFs is higher for national economies with a better institutional system 
than for countries with a less efficient institutional set up. Financial, legal and labor market 
institutions provide an important infrastructure sustaining business firms’ innovation 
activities, and this enhancing effect is stronger for group-affiliated firms in well-functioning 
and well-organized national systems of innovation. While it is true that GAFs may have 
strong internal capabilities and resources and hence partly make up for weak or inefficient 
institutions, as shown in previous research, we also find that firm-level innovative activities 
are greatly supported by country-level infrastructures and national systems of innovation: the 
stronger and more efficient these country-specific support mechanisms, the higher the 
innovativeness of business groups.   
An implication of this result is that institutional changes and economic reforms intended to 
make domestic markets more open, competitive and efficient – such as the extensive wave of 
privatizations, trade liberalization, financial and macroeconomic stabilization undertaken in 
many Latin American countries during the 1980s and 1990s – will not necessarily drive 
business groups out of the market, as it is sometimes argued in the literature. By contrast, the 
effect of institutional changes and market liberalization is often that business groups, by 
exploiting their superior capabilities and dominant market position, are able to develop new 
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strategies and find new market niches, whereas smaller standalone firms are more likely to 
loose market shares and shrink (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). The Latin American case 
analyzed in this paper does on the whole suggest that, when focusing on business groups 
innovation activities, a process of creative destruction is in place, according to which larger 
and well established domestic firms survive whereas smaller and less competitive enterprises 
are eventually driven out of the market. It is this evolutionary process – driven by 
competition, selection and innovation – that explains business dynamics in contemporary 
Latin America. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics – Whole sample  
 
 
Variable 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
GAF 0.124 0.329 0 1 6573 
INNO 0.451 0.497 0 1 6573 
SIZE 2.004 0.809 1 3 6573 
AGE 27.84 21.34 0 340 6535 
QUALITY 0.280 0.449 0 1 6263 
EDUC 10.33 3.95 0 100 6059 
ICT 0.868 0.338 0 1 6401 
DIVERSIF 30.36 26.14 1 100 6504 
URBAN 1.992 1.26 1 5 6573 
FINANCE 1.622 1.25 0 4 6504 
LEGAL 1.625 1.37 0 4 6369 
LABOR 
 
1.723 
 
1.21 
 
0 
 
4 
 
6549 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics – Mean values by country  
 
 Argentina Bolivia Chile Colombia 
Costa 
Rica 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ecuador 
El 
Salvador 
Guatemala Guyana 
GAF 0.212 0.266 0.183 0.011 0.079 0.065 0.075 0.192 0.065 0.222 
INNO 0.593 0.667 0.424 0.573 0.442 0.328 0.483 0.416 0.388 0.486 
SIZE 1.958 2.109 1.992 2.034 1.846 2.155 2.025 2.001 1.884 1.986 
AGE 34.59 29.92 32.77 25.08 26.24 21.95 31.59 26.53 26.00 27.93 
QUALITY 0.383 0.315 0.379 0.337 0.199 0.241 0.339 0.252 0.133 0.303 
EDUC 10.60 11.828 11.46 10.61 8.739 9.541 11.38 10.00 8.204 - 
ICT 0.948 0.857 0.882 0.953 0.860 0.917 0.958 0.840 0.745 - 
DIVERSIF 37.24 31.54 30.55 32.64 31.75 35.73 29.99 29.42 28.47 22.97 
URBAN 2.930 2.458 1.539 1.401 3.303 1.664 1.942 3.072 1.434 4.125 
FINANCE 2.037 1.607 1.410 1.937 2.182 1.553 1.479 2.048 1.572 1.267 
LEGAL 2.083 1.723 1.092 1.383 1.297 1.633 2.060 1.823 2.047 1.289 
LABOR 2.512 2.092 1.746 1.745 1.556 1.652 1.608 1.080 1.413 0.833 
Observations 
 
791 
 
120 
 
775 
 
705 
 
326 
 
122 
 
120 
 
125 
 
355 
 
72 
 
 
 
 Honduras Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua 
 
Panama 
 
Paraguay Peru Suriname Uruguay Venezuela 
GAF 0.100 0.074 0.146 0.079 0.087 0.118 0.133 0.026 0.044 0.153 
INNO 0.326 0.272 0.369 0.262 0.087 0.559 0.559 0.040 0.397 0.317 
SIZE 1.826 1.901 2.263 1.865 1.826 2.051 1.960 1.547 1.828 1.882 
AGE 24.81 34.07 24.85 27.78 24.48 27.47 22.62 21.15 34.46 26.13 
QUALITY 0.234 0.217 0.243 0.242 0.225 0.282 0.273 0.133 0.191 0.212 
EDUC 8.393 11.29 9.757 8.286 11.66 10.39 11.73 - 8.964 10.59 
ICT 0.637 0.647 0.885 0.516 0.583 0.898 0.906 - 0.814 0.929 
DIVERSIF 24.99 18.47 28.33 22.55 18.04 30.15 32.65 16.34 30.08 24.10 
URBAN 2.193 1.719 1.897 2.222 1.774 2.381 1.405 5.000 1.433 1.753 
FINANCE 1.671 1.775 1.568 1.306 0.817 1.144 1.323 2.093 1.327 1.287 
LEGAL 2.083 1.205 1.775 1.836 1.330 1.885 1.880 2.066 0.741 1.445 
LABOR 1.440 0.871 1.598 1.219 0.843 1.703 1.671 1.920 1.941 2.035 
Observations 
 
150 
 
121 
 
1152 
 
126 
 
115 
 
118 
 
760 
 
75 
 
360 
 
85 
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Table 3: Correlation coefficients 
 
 
 
GROUP INNO SIZE AGE ICT QUALITY EDUC DIVERSIF URBAN FINANCE LEGAL LABOR 
GAF 1.000            
INNO 0.096 1.000           
SIZE 0.145 0.241 1.000          
AGE 0.089 0.099 0.247 1.000         
ICT 0.099 0.243 0.294 0.096 1.000        
QUALITY 0.109 0.252 0.380 0.183 0.180 1.000       
EDUC 0.067 0.064 0.048 0.036 0.073 0.099 1.000      
DIVERSIF 0.053 0.141 0.085 0.133 0.095 0.084 0.053 1.000     
URBAN 0.018 0.023  - 0.077  - 0.004  - 0.048 0.020  - 0.035    -0.023 1.000    
FINANCE  - 0.045 0.006  - 0.112  - 0.083  - 0.024   - 0.096  - 0.034 0.003 0.051 1.000   
LEGAL 0.024 0.007 0.053 0.005 0.028 0.019  - 0.025 0.039 0.010 0.243 1.000  
LABOR 
 
0.038 
 
0.112 
 
0.079 
 
0.083 
 
0.118 
 
0.027 
 
0.000 
 
0.061 
 
0.037 
 
0.266 
 
0.384 
 
1.000 
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Table 4: Propensity score matching (PSM) estimation results. 
 
 
 
 
Full model specification  
(as in equation 1) 
 
 
Model excluding  
the three country-level variables 
 
Matching method 
 
K-nearest neighbors 
 
Kernel 
 
K-nearest neighbors 
 
Kernel 
 
Average GAF 
(treated) 
0.589 0.589 0.584 0.584 
Average SAF 
(controls) 
0.509 0.496 0.498 0.495 
Difference  
(ATT) 
0.080 0.093 0.086 0.089 
Standard 
error 
     0.021***       0.020***       0.020***       0.020*** 
Number of GAF 
(treated) 
733 733 756 756 
Number of SAF 
(controls) 
5146 5146 5375 5375 
Mean bias: 
Before matching 
15.6% 15.6% 16.2% 16.2% 
Mean bias:  
After matching 
 
3.3% 
 
3.4% 
 
2.2% 
 
2.7% 
 
 
Legend: GAF: group-affiliated firms; SAF: Standalone firms; ATT: average treatment effect on the treated 
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Table 5: Estimation results for equation 2. Dependent variable: INNO. Estimation method: 
bivariate probit. 
 
 
 
 
 
(6) (7) (8) (9) 
H1 GAF 
0.676 
(2.08)** 
0.531 
(1.53) 
0.669 
(1.91)* 
0.596 
(1.68)* 
 SIZE 
0.233 
(7.29)*** 
0.237 
(7.40)*** 
0.234 
(7.30)*** 
0.236 
(7.34)*** 
 AGE 
-0.0003 
(0.33) 
-0.0003 
(0.35) 
-0.0002 
(0.31) 
-0.0003 
(0.33) 
 ICT 
0.708 
(10.53)*** 
0.709 
(10.54)*** 
0.709 
(10.54)*** 
0.708  
(10.50)*** 
 QUALITY 
0.368 
(7.52)*** 
0.372 
(7.62)*** 
0.369 
(7.54)*** 
0.371 
(7.56)*** 
 EDUC 
0.003 
(0.66) 
0.003 
(0.68) 
0.003 
(0.66) 
0.003 
(0.69) 
 URBAN 
0.047 
(2.66)*** 
0.048 
(2.68)*** 
0.047 
(2.65)*** 
0.047 
(2.67)*** 
 
FINANCE 
0.026 
(1.55) 
0.027 
(1.70)* 
0.027 
(1.72)* 
0.027 
(1.64) 
H2 LEGAL 
0.026 
(1.73)* 
0.018 
(1.15) 
0.026 
(1.72)* 
0.017 
(1.05) 
 LABOR 
0.049 
(2.78)*** 
0.048 
(2.73)*** 
0.048 
(2.62)*** 
0.052 
(2.81)*** 
 
FINANCE * GAF 
0.014 
(0.31) 
  
-0.008 
(0.16) 
H3 LEGAL * GAF  
0.069 
(1.74)* 
 
0.086 
(1.88)* 
 LABOR * GAF   
0.005 
(0.12) 
-0.038 
(0.74) 
 
 
Industry dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
Country dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
LR χ2 
 
1459.54*** 1456.58*** 1456.50*** 1460.15*** 
 
Observations 
 
5466 
 
5466 
 
5466 
 
5466 
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Table 6: Estimation results for equation 2. Dependent variable: INNO. Estimation method: 
bivariate probit. 
 
 
 
 
 
(10) (11) (12) (13) 
H1 GAF 
0.683  
(2.08)** 
   
 SIZE 
0.234 
(7.31)*** 
0.234 
(7.31)*** 
0.233 
(7.29)*** 
0.233 
(7.29)*** 
 AGE 
-0.0002 
(0.31) 
-0.0003 
(0.30) 
-0.0003 
(0.30) 
-0.0003 
(0.30) 
 ICT 
0.709 
(10.54)*** 
0.709 
(10.53)*** 
0.708 
(10.53)*** 
0.708 
(10.53)*** 
 QUALITY 
0.369 
(7.54)*** 
0.369 
(7.55)*** 
0.368 
(7.51)*** 
0.368 
(7.51)*** 
 EDUC 
0.003 
(0.66) 
0.003 
(0.66) 
0.003 
(0.66) 
0.003 
(0.66) 
 URBAN 
0.047 
(2.65)*** 
0.047 
(2.64)*** 
0.047 
(2.63)*** 
0.047 
(2.63)*** 
 
FINANCE 
0.027 
(1.72)* 
0.027 
(1.72)* 
0.028 
(1.73)* 
0.028 
(1.73)* 
H2 LEGAL 
0.026 
(1.74)* 
0.026 
(1.75)* 
0.026 
(1.74)* 
0.026 
(1.74)* 
 LABOR 
0.048 
(2.77)*** 
0.048 
(2.76)*** 
0.048 
(2.76)*** 
0.048 
(2.76)*** 
 
GAF * FINANCE GOOD  
0.693 
(2.09)** 
  
 GAF * FINANCE BAD  
0.672 
(2.02)** 
  
 GAF *LEGAL GOOD   
0.732 
(2.13)** 
 
H4 
 
GAF * LEGAL BAD   
0.684 
(2.11)** 
 
 GAF *LABOR GOOD    
0.732 
(2.13)** 
 GAF * LABOR BAD    
0.684 
(2.11)** 
 
 
Industry dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
Country dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
Observations 
 
5466 
 
5466 
 
 
5466 
 
 
5466 
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Table 7: Coefficients of correlation between GAFs’ innovativeness and country-specific institutional conditions.  
 
Country characteristics 
 
Variable 
 
Whole sample 
(N=75) 
Latin America 
(N=20) 
Definition 
of variable 
Source 
 
 
Financial institutions 
 
FINANCE FREEDOM 
 
+ 0.225 + 0.166 Freedom of finance  Heritage Foundation 
 
 
STOCKS TRADED 
 
+ 0.055 + 0.046 Stocks traded, % of GDP  World Bank, WDI 
 
 
Legal institutions 
 
QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
+ 0.178 + 0.044 
Corruption perception index 
(0: high corr..; 10: low corr.) 
Transparency International 
 
 
FREEDOM OF PRESS 
 
+ 0.217 + 0.197 Freedom of press index Reporters Without Borders 
 
 
Labor market institutions 
 
LABOR UNION POWER 
 
- 0.076 - 0.597 
Index measuring the statutory 
protection and power of unions 
Botero et al. (2004) 
 
 
COLLECTIVE DISPUTES 
 
- 0.027 - 0.596 
Index measuring the protection of 
workers during collective disputes 
Botero et al. (2004) 
 
 
HUMAN CAPITAL 
 
+ 0.250 + 0.344 Mean years of schooling World Bank, WDI 
Other structural 
characteristics 
 
PHYISICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
+ 0.201 + 0.097 Electric power consumption World Bank, WDI 
 
 
ICT INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
+ 0.249 + 0.620 Internet users per 1000 people World Bank, WDI 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1: Estimation results for equation 1. Dependent variable: GAF. Estimation method: 
bivariate probit. 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SIZE 
0.237 
(7.17)*** 
0.233 
(7.05)*** 
0.237 
(7.16)*** 
0.237 
(7.14)*** 
0.231 
(6.94)*** 
AGE 
0.002 
(1.74)* 
0.002 
(1.68)* 
0.002 
(1.74)* 
0.002 
(1.74)* 
0.002 
(1.64) 
QUALITY 
0.173 
(3.14)*** 
0.167 
(3.04)*** 
0.173 
(3.14)*** 
0.173 
(3.14)*** 
0.167 
(3.04)*** 
DIVERSIF 
0.003 
(2.86)*** 
0.003 
(2.94)*** 
0.003 
(2.86)*** 
0.002 
(2.86)*** 
0.003 
(2.93)*** 
FINANCE  
-0.037 
(1.90)* 
  
-0.043 
(2.06)** 
LEGAL   
0.003 
(0.20) 
 
0.010 
(0.55) 
LABOR    
0.001 
(0.07) 
0.08 
(0.36) 
 
Industry dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Country dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
LR χ2 
 
1452.19*** 1455.81*** 1452.23*** 1452.19*** 1456.48 
Observations 
 
5466 
 
5466 
 
5466 
 
5466 5466 
 
